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Comparative Legal Responses to
Terrorism: Lessons from Europe
By JEREMIE J. WATrELLIER*
Introduction
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress and President
initiated legal changes to combat terrorism. In the late 20th century,
Europe also experienced terrorist attacks on its soil and initiated legal
adaptations. Europe's legal history with terrorism shows that harsh
procedure-stripping rules do not stop terrorism and come at great
cost to civil liberties and legal clout. More procedural safeguards
would bring the U.S. legal response back in line with its traditional
legal values while still providing a way to fight terrorism. This note
investigates the European legal responses to its terrorist attacks in
order to ascertain the prudence of the current U.S. legal response to
terrorism.
I will begin by looking at the Western European legal reactions
to their terrorist problems. The focus of the comparison will be on
Algerian Islamist terrorism in France, Basque terrorism in Spain, and
Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism in England. Though
Europeans have made recent legal reforms since September 11, I will
focus on their older terrorism-related legal reforms because it is too
early to evaluate the merit of their more recent post-September 11
reforms. Next, I will briefly examine the American response to
terrorist incidents (other articles have looked at the American
response in depth'). Third, I will compare and contrast the two
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004. I
would like to thank Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza for her guidance in publishing
this note.
1. E.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions,
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1407 (2002); Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human
Rights in the United States: The Aftermath of September l1th, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
continents' terrorist problems in order to see if there are enough
similarities to warrant a comparison of their legal responses. Fourth,
I will compare the two legal responses. Fifth, where possible, I will
analyze the success of the European measures and gauge the costs of
the measures. Finally, I will evaluate the prudence of the current U.S.
reaction in light of Europe's history.
I. Terrorism in Europe and European Legal Responses
France, Spain and the United Kingdom 'share similar political,
cultural and legal traditions with the United States. Although
national differences exist, the commonalities among these Western
democracies provide a useful basis for comparison of legal responses
to terrorism.
A. France
France has more significant experience with terrorism than most
European countries. Most terrorist attacks in France have been
staged by Middle Eastern or Islamist groups. For example, the
Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Preaching and Combat Group
(the two main Algerian terrorist organizations) among others, have
been active in France.'
As a response to Middle Eastern terrorism in the 1980s, France
enacted anti-terrorist legislation.! The central piece of legislation was
the September 9th Act of 1986.' The Act created harsher legal
procedures for terrorist acts', enhanced the government's ability to
obtain accomplice evidence and gave jurisdiction to the Paris
Regional Court. The prolonged detention period gave authorities
more time to collect evidence and to prevent flight. Although the
detention period was extended, procedural safeguards were put in
place to protect the suspects. These safeguards included a
requirement that authorities petition with adequate grounds,' that the
& CoM. REG. 1 (2002).
2. ERIK VAN DE LINDE ET AL., RAND EUROPE, QUICK SCAN OF POST 9/11
NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN
SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 50 (2002) available at
<www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1590/MR1590.pdf> (visited Mar. 3,2004).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Law No. 86-1020 of September 9,1986, D. (France).
6. VAN DE LINDE, supra note 2, at 50-51.
7. ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL
[Vol. 27:397
Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism
detainee be seen by a magistrate8 and that the detainee be seen by a
doctor 9 so as to avoid physical abuse. °
The 1986 Act also enhanced the government's ability to get
accomplice evidence.1 Article 463-1 exempts punishment when a
member of a terrorist group informs authorities of an attack and the
attack is avoided. Article 463-2 reduces punishment when a
participant of a terrorist group helps the authorities identify or arrest
those responsible for the terrorist attack. 3
The 1986 Act also placed terrorist cases in the jurisdiction of the
Paris Regional Court because of their national importance.'4 A
consequence is that a small group of Parisian magistrates presided
over all terrorist cases that dealt with organized groups."
B. Spain
The Basque separatist organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna
(ETA) desires an independent homeland for Basques in four
northern Spanish provinces.16 ETA advocates violent action to
achieve political autonomy, and 800 people have died at the hands of
the ETA since 1968.7 Under Franco's regime, authoritarian
measures were used to suppress Basque dissidents. However, after
Franco's death in 1975, Spain transitioned to democracy and was
forced to balance its security interests with its desire to leave
authoritarian policing in the past.19
Under Article 17.2 of the 1975 Spanish Constitution, detentions
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 239 (1992) (citing Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986,
art. 706-16, D.).
8. Id. at 240 (citing Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, art. 706-23, D.).
9. Id. at 239 (citing Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, art. 706-23.4, D.).
10. Id. at 239-40.
11. See id. at 281.
12. Id.; Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, art. 463-1, D.
13. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 281; Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, art. 463-2,
D.
14. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 320 (citing Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, art.
716-17, D.).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 168.
17. VAN DE LINDE, supra note 2, at 94.
18. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
19. But see Paddy Woodworth, Spanish Crackdown Has Deprived Radical
Basques of Political, IRISH TIMES, June 18, 2003, at 16 (explaining how Spain is
cracking down on the ETA by banning the Basque political party Herri Batasuna).
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were generally limited to seventy-two hours, after which the detainee
was to be freed or presented to a judge. Spain made exceptions to
this rule in Article 55.2, which allowed lawmakers to suspend
constitutional rights when terrorism was involved, and gave
authorities ten days to detain a suspect and investigate his case.21
Terrorist suspects were held incommunicado but had the right to a
lawyer. Detainees were given the right to habeas corpus
proceedings' and statutes were implemented protecting them from
torture.24
Spain also rewarded "repentant" terrorists.25 Under Spanish law
in the 1980s, penalties took into consideration whether the terrorist
renounced his past activities and whether he had prevented possible
terrorist acts by providing information or evidence.26 Spain also
implemented a policy of reinserci6n, which allowed exiled terrorists to
re-integrate into Spanish society conditioned upon their cooperation
with the government.27
After Franco's death, Spain created a national court, seated in
the capital, which had nationwide jurisdiction in several fields,
including terrorism.28 Thus, a terrorist suspect in the Basque country
would have to travel to Madrid to be heard, thereby burdening the
suspect by separating him from his family, friends and community.
Spain also had experience using military courts under Franco.29
In most countries, military courts' jurisdiction is limited to military
questions." However in Spain, at various times, the crime of military
rebellion was extended to political offenses, banditry and other acts
unrelated to the military.3' Military trials had less procedural
20. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 228; CONSTITUCION ESPAROL [C.E.] art. 17.2
(Spain).
21. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 229; C.E. art. 55.2.
22. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 230 (citing LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL
[L.E.Civ.] art. 506 (Spain)).
23. Id. (citing Law of Habeas Corpus 6/1984 (Spain)).
24. Id. (citing C6digo Penal [C.P.] art. 204 bis (Spain)).
25. See id. at 258.
26. Id. at 268; Organic Law 9/1984, art. 6 (Spain).
27. See VERCHER, supra note 7, at 275.
28. Id. at 315 (citing Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.1 art. 65 (1985)
(Spain)).
29. Id. at 306.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 308-09.
[Vol. 27:397
Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism
12
safeguards than normal courts. Summary procedures were
particularly harsh: for example, the accused did not have a lawyer33
and his representative only had a few hours to draw up a written
defense. 4 In 1976, as Spain transitioned to democracy, the use of
military courts was abandoned.35
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom also experienced terrorism well before
September 11.36 Decolonization in the 1950s through 1970s led to
terrorist activities against Great Britain.37 However, Northern Ireland
has been the primary source of terrorism in the United Kingdom: the
IRA has killed over 1,800 soldiers and civilians since 1969.38
The United Kingdom has used internment to combat terrorism.39
"Internment is an executive measure meaning detention without trial
of persons believed to be a danger to the state."4 The Detention of
Terrorists Order of 1972 allowed anyone "suspected of having been
concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of
terrorism or in the direction, organisation or training of persons for
the purpose of terrorism" to be detained for twenty-eight days.41
After twenty-eight days, the detainee was released or referred to a
commissioner, someone with legal experience appointed by the
secretary of state.42 The commissioner would hear the case, but the
hearing was primarily an executive procedure and not a judicial one.
For example, the detainee could be excluded from the proceeding if
national security was at stake.43 The hearing could be based on
32. Id. at 309.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 310 (citing Code of Military Justice art. 927 (Spain)).
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id.
36. VAN DE LINDE, supra note 2, at 103.
37. Id.
38. See Irish Republican Army, ENCYCLOPA'EDIA BRITANNICA 2003, available at
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=43741> (visited Oct. 28, 2003).
39. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 9.
40. Id. (citing E.T. McGovern, Internment and Detention Without Trial in the
Light of the European Convention of Human Rights, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTs 219
(J.W. Bridge et al. eds., 1973)).
41. Id. at 20 (citing Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order, Statutory
Instrument (Northern Ireland 15) No. 1632, art. 4(1) (1972)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 20-21.
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hearsay.' These measures denied defendants traditional common-
law rights. At various times the procedure was modified, but
internment was ultimately abandoned in 1980.41
The United Kingdom also had experience with exclusion
orders 6. 4  Exclusion orders prevented someone from entering or
remaining in the country.47 They were preventive measures, not
punitive measures.4 '8 As with internment proceedings, there was little
judicial oversight of exclusion orders in Britain.49 Courts were mostly
concerned that the exclusion proceedings follow the statute." Under
the various statutes,51 those subject to exclusion orders had few
rights. 2 For example, they had no right to know what evidence the
exclusion order was based on or to appeal. 3 Thus, by failing to limit
the executive's procedure-stripping, British courts have proven
reluctant to infringe upon the executive's security interests.
54
Special powers of arrest have been used to gather information
and to prevent terrorism in the United Kingdom.5 These powers
have infringed on traditional civil liberties, such as the right to due
process. 6 For example, under the Northern Ireland Act of 1978, a
constable had the power to arrest, without a warrant, anyone he
suspected of being a terrorist and could detain him for seventy-two
hours.5 7 Another example of special anti-terrorist powers is found in
the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1984, which applied throughout
the United Kingdom. 8 Under this act, if a constable had reasonable
grounds for suspecting someone was involved with terrorism, the
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 21-22.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 40 (citing W. L. Twining, Emergency Powers and Criminal Process: The
Diplock Report, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 415).
49. See id. at 39-42
50. See id. at 45-46.
51. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922 (U.K);
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1939 (U.K.); Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, 1976, 1984, and 1989 (U.K.).
52. See VERCHER, supra note 7, at 35-39.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 46.
55. See id. at 53.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 53-54 (citing Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, § 11(1), (3)
1978 (U.K.)).
58. See id. at 56 (citing Prevention of Terrorism Act, § 12(1)(a)-(c) 1984 (U.K.)).
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constable could search any place that a terrorist suspect might be."
Moreover, the suspect could be rearrested a number of times, even if
it only related to the same matter.6° The United Kingdom also used
methods of gathering information developed in colonial times.6'
These methods included mass arrests and interrogation, where high-
pitched noise, sleep-deprivation, starvation and other techniques
were used to extract information from suspects.62  The United
Kingdom also has an extensive network of video surveillance.63
In order to gather evidence, immunity and other privileges are
offered to accomplices-in return for cooperation with the
government on terrorist matters. 6' One problem with accomplice
evidence is its reliability. Because the accomplice is receiving
advantages in exchange for information, there is an incentive to make
up information.6 Therefore, corroboration of the evidence can be
required in order for the defendant to be convicted on this type of
evidence. 6 However in Northern Ireland, people have been found
guilty based on uncorroborated evidence. 6'
The United Kingdom also set up special Diplock courts, named
after the chairman of a commission that designed them, to deal with
terrorism.69 The goals of the courts were to ensure a high number of
convictions and to de-politicize the crimes in Northern Ireland." In
order to bypass the limitations of the traditional common-law rules,
Diplock courts do away with the jury and have less stringent rules of
evidence and proof.7'
59. Id.
60. Id. at 62 (citing Exparte Lynch, [1980] 126 N.Ir. 133).
61. See id. at 66; cf. Mark Bowden, The Persuaders, OBSERVER MAGAZINE, Oct.
19, 2003, at 28 (noting that the United States is now also confronting the fine line
between torture and "coercion" (also known as "torture lite" or "torture light") in its
own war on terror).
62. See VERCHER, supra note 7, at 66.
63. See id. at 84-85.
64. See id. at 86.
65. See id. at 94-95.
66. See id. at 96 (citing R. v. Graham, [1984] 2 N.I.B.J. 18).
67. See id. at 96.
68. Id. at 96-97.
69. Id. at 120.
70. Id. at 120-21.
71. Id. at 120.
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D. European Institutions and European Cooperation
European countries have cooperated in order to fight terrorism.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Europeans created the European Convention
on Extradition and the European Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorism, which made it easier for states to extradite suspected
terrorists to other countries.72 Nevertheless, states were still able to
find exceptions to the conventions and impede extradition.73 In the
1980s, several European countries created the Schengen system,
which established a central database on criminals and aliens.7"
Judicial cooperation gained further recognition in the 1992 Treaty on
European Union, where such matters were deemed to be one of three
pillars of the Union." The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty further defined
judicial and police cooperation.76  Nevertheless, police activity
remains under the control of the several states of Europe.77 Police
cooperation in Europe is still in many ways a matter of international
cooperation rather than of federal cooperation.8
International agreements and European institutions have limited
Western European member states' legal response to terrorism. The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms79 "provides for judicially enforceable human
rights obligations through an international treaty."' France, Great
Britain and Spain are parties.8  Between 1959 and 1989, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found twenty-three
72. Id. at 350-51; European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, Europ.T.S.
No. 24; European Convention on the Suppression Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 1137
U.N.T.S. 93.
73. See VERCHER, supra note 7, at 351.
74. Stephen Skinner, The Third Pillar Treaty Provisions on Police Cooperation:
Has the EU Bitten Off More Than it Can Chew?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 203, 207 (2002).
75. Id. at 203.
76. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED
ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.
77. See Skinner, supra note 74, at 218-20.
78. Id.
79. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
80. DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1997).
81. See Charter of Fundamental Rights, at <www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/
libe/elsj/charter/un-legislationen.htm> (visited Oct. 10, 2003) (stating that all
European Union members, which includes France, Spain, and the United Kingdom,
are parties to the convention).
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human rights violations in the United Kingdom and two human rights
violations each in France and Spain.82
The European Convention on Human Rights declares that
everyone "has the right to liberty and security of person" and that an
individual can only be deprived of this liberty right under certain
circumstances, none of which mention suspected terrorism.83 If a
member state violates these rights, an individual has a right to
compensation.8' However, the Convention allows states to derogate
from Article 5 in emergency situations and in times of war.85 The
ECHR has ultimate jurisdiction to decide whether a derogation was
86proper.
The cases of Fox and Brogan set limits on anti-terrorism
measures when there is no derogation (i.e., when the country is not in
an emergency situation).' In Fox, police arrested and detained two
people upon "suspicion" that they were terrorists under a 1978 British
anti-terrorist law.' The Convention, however, requires "reasonable
suspicion." The Court found the United Kingdom in breach of the
Convention because the suspects' prior terrorist convictions seven
years earlier did not create a reasonable suspicion.'
In Brogan, terrorist suspects were detained for at least four days
under a 1984 British anti-terrorist act without access to a judge.91
Article 5(3) of the Convention requires that detainees be brought
"promptly" before a judge. 92 The ECHR found that the United
Kingdom had breached the Convention because four days detention
was too long under the plain meaning of the word "promptly." 93 The
82. JACKSON, supra note 80, at 17.
83. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 79, art. 5(1)(c).
84. Id. art. 5(5).
85. Id. art. 15.
86. Id. art. 32.
87. Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 157 (ser. A)
(1991); Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (ser. A) (1988).
88. Brogan, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 159 (citing Northern Ireland Emergency
Provisions Act, § 11(1) 1978 (U.K.)); see VERCHER, supra note 7, at 53-54.
89. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 79, art. 5(1)(c).
90. Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 169.
91. Brogan, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 120 (citing Prevention of Terrorism Act, §
12(1)(a)-(c) 1984 (U.K.).
92. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 79, art. 5(3).
93. Brogan, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 at 135-136.
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following cases look at the limits on anti-terrorism measures in times
of national emergency.
In the case of Lawless v. Ireland, the ECHR was asked whether
Ireland's detainment of individuals, without trial, under an emergency
powers regulation was a legitimate derogation from Article 5.94 The
ECHR looked at three factors to decide if the derogation was
legitimate: (1) whether Ireland had properly communicated its
derogation; (2) whether there existed a public emergency threatening
the life of the nation; and (3),whether Ireland's derogation was
proportional in light of the circumstances.9 The Court found that the
presence of terrorist organizations threatening Ireland's domestic and
foreign relations was adequate cause for declaring an emergency."
The ECHR found that Ireland's derogation was proportional because
the "application of the ordinary law had proved unable to check the
growing danger"97 and because there were a "number of safeguards
designed to prevent abuses in the operation of the system of
administrative detention." 98 The procedural safeguards included the
fact that Parliament was kept abreast of the act's enforcement and
could annul the act at any time; a three-person detention commission,
two of which were judges and the third being a defense officer; and
the judiciary's power to compel the detention commission "to carry
out its functions. ' 9
In The Greek Case, the European Commission of Human Rights
(Commission) put forth more criteria for establishing whether a state
of emergency was validly declared."° A 1972 Greek military coup was
challenged, in part, under the derogation clause of the Convention."'
The Commission, concluding there was no emergency that would
excuse a derogation,"° held that an emergency must be actual or
imminent; its effects must involve the whole nation; the continuance
of the organized life of the community must be threatened; and the
crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or
94. Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 (ser. A) (1961).
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 31.
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 71-72 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.).
101. See id. at 19-20.
102. See id. at 71-86.
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restrictions permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of
public safety, health and order are plainly inadequate. 3
In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Commission was
again asked whether a derogation in a time of emergency was valid. "
In this 1971 case, Ireland alleged that the United Kingdom's
detentions without trial were not proportional to the emergency.105
The Commission, siding with the United Kingdom, recognized that
"the national authorities are.., in a better position than the
international judge to decide both on the presence of such an
emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to
avert it."'" While the states' power to derogate is not unlimited, the
Commission does grant states a significant "margin of
appreciation."'07
In the cases of Brannigan and Aksoy, the ECHR defined the
limits of anti-terrorism measures even when the conditions for
derogation are met." The complaint in Brannigan was similar to the
one in Brogan,'" such that the question became whether four-day
detentions without access to a judge were permissible in times of
derogation."0 The Court held the United Kingdom had not exceeded
their margin of appreciation because of the safeguards provided by
the government.1 ' These safeguards included a right to a habeas
corpus remedy, the right to an attorney after two days, the right to
inform someone about their detention and the right to see a doctor."2
In Aksoy, Turkey also argued that a prolonged detention was
justified by a state of emergency, this time a national emergency
involving Kurdish terrorism."' Nevertheless, the ECHR found that
103. See id. at 71-72.
104. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (ser. A) at 90-91 (1978).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 92.
107. Id.
108. Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 539, 543 (ser. A) (1993) (A
policeman, who attacked Sinn Fein Headquarters in Belfast, shot and killed McBride,
one of the parties.); Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 553, 561 (1996) (Aksoy was
executed before the ECHR could hear his case. His family alleged the government
killed him; the government-held by the court to have tortured Aksoy-alleged it
was a rival Kurdish faction.).
109. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
110. Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 554.
111. Id.at 563.
112. Id. at 562.
113. Aksoy, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 578-88.
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Turkey had breached the Convention, despite the state of emergency
deemed to exist, because the two-week detention without access to a
judge was "exceptionally long" and because there were "insufficient
safeguards." '114 In particular, the court noted there was "no speedy
remedy of habeas corpus and no legally enforceable rights of the
access to a lawyer, doctor, friend or relative." '115 The contrast between
this holding and that of Brannigan, demonstrates that the ECHR
considers procedural safeguards like habeas corpus and access to the
outside to be requisites for an acceptable derogation of the
Convention.
Thus, at the very least, the ECHR and other European
institutions have put pressure on states that insisted on implementing
harsh legal measures to combat terrorism. In Fox and Brogan, the
ECHR limited member states' rights when there is no national
emergency. Through its holdings in Lawless, The Greek Case and
Ireland, the ECHR and the European Commission of Human Rights
have placed limits on when states can infringe on civil liberties in
times of emergency. 6 Finally, in Brannigan and Aksoy, the ECHR
defined the limits placed on states in times of national emergency.
II. American Legal Response to Terrorism
As a result of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress, in
1996, enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and
the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. "7
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provided
new definitions and enhanced penalties for terrorist crimes, revised
immigration procedures to streamline deportation of criminals, and
authorized increased funding for law enforcement to fight terrorism.
The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996
addressed the threats posed by biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons. Several congressional committees also responded to
specific terrorist threats by creating targeted programs within federal
114. Id. at 589-90.
115. Id. at 590.
116. See generally Virginia Helen Henning, Note, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made a Valid Derogation from the
European Convention of Human Rights?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1263 (2002)
(discussing whether recent post-9/11 changes in the United Kingdom are valid
derogations from Article 15).
117. Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 436
(2002).
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agencies."'
During the time these acts were being put into place, blue-ribbon
commissions found that the government's ability to fight and prevent
terrorism was inadequate. 19  At the time, civil liberty concerns
prevented Congress from acting on some of commission's
recommendations.120  These recommendations would be addressed
after September 11.121
After September 11, Congress responded with the Patriot Act
(Act).122 The Act made it easier for agencies like the FBI and CIA to
share information.123 The Act made broad espionage warrants
available and permitted the authorities to engage in substantially
more aggressive electronic surveillance." Next, the Act gave the
government stronger anti-money laundering abilities to prevent funds
from getting to terrorists.'25 Finally, the Act allowed the detention of
non-citizens for indefinite periods of time and the detention of
citizens designated as "enemy combatants" by the President, with
little or no judicial review. 6
The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service also responded
to September 11 by implementing a registration program for Muslim
non-citizens over sixteen years of age. 27  Moreover, the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service became a sub-agency of the





122. Id. at 439.
123. Id. at 440.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233
F. Supp. 2d 564, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3488 (U.S. Feb.
20, 2004) (No. 03-1027) (holding that the President had authority to order prisoner's
detention despite his U.S. citizenship and that the President's determination could be
sustained by meeting the "some evidence" standard).
127. See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SPECIAL REGISTRATION, at
<http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/lawenfor/specialreg/index.htm> (visited Nov. 17,
2003); see Christopher Parkes, Anti-terror Programme in US Runs into Controversy,
FIN. TIMES, December 20, 2002, at 8.
128. See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WHO WILL BE PART OF THE
NEW DEPARTMENT?, at <www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=13> (visited Oct. 26,
2003).
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towards security concerns for the agency.
President Bush also issued an executive order enabling military
commissions to try individual terrorism suspects. Here, the accused
do not have many procedural safeguards."' They have a right to
counsel, but counsel must have security clearance.' The accused are
entitled to be informed of the charges against them and can examine
the evidence presented against them before trial, but only if their
counsel has security clearance to view the evidence.132 The trials are
closed to the media and there is no independent judicial review.33
Everyone else involved in the trial is an active-duty or retired
member of the armed forces.' In sum, the procedural rules offered
appear to be largely for show.'35
III. Differences and Similarities Between the Two Continents'
Terrorist Problems
Before we analyze the prudence of the U.S. legal response in
light of European experience, we must first determine if the United
States can learn from Europe at all. If the two continents' problems
are too different, a legal comparison might be unwarranted.
In matters of domestic terrorism, the United States and Europe
have considerably different terrorist problems. Europe's domestic
terrorism stems from ethnic and regional desires for autonomy. In
the United Kingdom, Irish Catholics want an end to the United
Kingdom's control over Northern Ireland. In France and Spain, the
Basques seek independence. Additionally, France deals with claims
of independence from Corsicans. The roots of terrorism in Britain,
Spain, and France are based on long-standing ethnic and regional
identities and are therefore deeper than those in the United States.
Domestic terrorism in the United States, on the other hand, has
not come from ethnic minorities or regional groups. Instead,
members of the ethnic majority have committed terrorist acts in an
129. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1410 (citing Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001,
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1417.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1410.
134. Id. at 1417.
135. Id. at 1418.
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attempt to lessen the power of the federal government. Domestic
terrorism in the United States is also a smaller problem in comparison
with Europe. Fewer people have died from domestic terrorism in the
United States than in Europe. 136 Domestic terrorism in the United
States has a much more recent history.37
In matters of international terrorism, Europe and the Untied
States have more in common. On both continents, the principal
source of terrorism has been the Middle East. In particular, the
terrorist acts have had a connection to the Western government's
involvement in the Middle East. For example, Iranian terrorism in
France was in response to France's sale of arms to Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war.138 Osama Bin Laden claimed that the World Trade
Center attacks were in response to the U.S. support of Israel and its
military presence in the Persian Gulf. On both continents, terrorists
targeted civilian areas. Whereas some domestic acts of terrorism
have been aimed at government or military installations, France's
Metro and New York's Twin Towers were targeted by international
terrorists.
International terrorism in Europe and the United States also has
its differences. International terrorism has a longer history in
Europe. Germany experienced Palestinian terrorism as early as the
1970s at the Munich Olympic Games. The United States, long
thought to be out of reach of international terrorism, experienced its
first significant act of international terrorism on its own soil with the
first World Trade Center bombing in 1993."9 While the history of
international terrorism in the United States is shorter than in Europe,
it is already deadlier. ' No European country has sustained the
casualties the United States did on September 11. Another difference
136. Oklahoma City Bombing Trial-1995, CNN.coM, at <www.cnn.com/US/
9703/okc.trial/timeline/1995.html> (visited Feb. 4, 2003) (Oklahoma City's death toll
was 168); see supra notes 17, 38 and accompanying text (noting that Spain and Britain
have seen thousands of deaths).
137. Mark B. Baker, The Western European Legal Response to Terrorism, 13
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1987) (The Oklahoma City bombing took place in 1995.
There were terrorist campaigns in Ireland as early as 1920).
138. Dennis A. Pluchinsky, Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe in
the 1980s: A Decade of Violence, in EUROPEAN TERRORISM TODAY & TOMORROW 12
(Yonah Alexander & Dennis Pluchinsky eds., 1992).
139. Doug Struck et al., Borderless Network of Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
2001, at Al.
140. World Trade Center Death Toll Drops by Two, CNN.cOM, Nov. 2, 2003, at
<www.cnn.com/2002/US/Northeast/11/02/wtc.death.toll/>.
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is that Europe has more Muslims than the United States does.14' This
would make religious profiling more difficult in Europe. Also, there
is probably more global animosity towards the United States than
towards Europe today. As the world's lone superpower, the biggest
supporter of Israel, and the largest Western force in both Gulf Wars,
the United States is a favored target of Islamic terrorism compared to
Europe. This magnitude of animosity probably presents different
obstacles for U.S. anti-terrorist efforts. Nevertheless, Europe
continues to be a target of Islamic terrorism in its own right. 42 At the
time anti-terrorist legislation was passed in France, for example, it
was a primary target of Middle-Eastern • Therefore,
despite the differences in terrorist problems, the United States can
learn from Europe's legal experience with terrorism.
IV. The U.S. and European Legal Responses Compared
Both continents have responded to terrorism by removing
procedural protections from their legal systems. In response to tragic
conditions, "the U.S. government passed legislation that reduces or
eliminates the process of judicial review and erodes our civil
liberties."'" On the whole, this is the same response Europeans
made. While there are, of course, technical and procedural variations
between the two, at the heart of the matter is a removal of process
that lies at the heart of both continents' democracies.
In both cases, the executive took initiative over what is usually
the judiciary's domain. For example, in Great Britain, the executive's
commissioners determined whether a detainee was to be detained any
further.' 5 In the United States, the President ordered military
tribunals be used to try suspected terrorists without any judicial
review."' In this particular situation, the U.S. response might be even
141. Worldwide Adherents of All Religions by Six Continental Areas, Mid-2001
(ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 2003 DELUXE EDITION CD-ROM) (showing
31,724,000 Muslims in Europe compared to 4,518,000 Muslims in North America).
142. Terrorism Threat in Spain, Germany, ONE NEWS, Jan. 25, 2003, at
<http://onenews.nzoom.com/onenewsdetail/0,1227,163830-1-9,00.html> (mentioning
an Al Qaeda plan to attack important French buildings).
143. See Pluchinsky, supra note 138, at 6, fig.1.1 (showing France as a primary
target in the 1980s).
144. Gross, supra note 1, at 2.
145. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
146. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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more severe because the British response allowed judges to review
cases,147 albeit reluctantly.1
48
To the extent they are comparable, the U.S. federal courts have
been less inclined than the European legal institutions to overturn
executive acts implementing harsh legal procedures. We saw above
that European institutions have placed limits on harsh European
member-state legal procedures. 149  So far, U.S. federal courts have
declined jurisdiction regarding detainment of prisoners in Cuba on
the grounds that the prisoners are not on U.S. territory. ° At present,
it appears that the U.S. legal response to terrorism may have less
judicial review than the European legal responses have had.
On the whole, the United States is using many of the same tools
that Europe has used to battle terrorism. Prolonged detentions,
increased surveillance and search powers, and procedurally-stripped
trials were all used in Europe. We can now ask to what extent these
tools worked for the Europeans and to what extent it is prudent for
the United States to continue adopting these measures.
V. Effectiveness and Costs of the European Response
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of any legal response to
terrorism.' Nobody knows how many terrorists are plotting attacks
at a given moment or how many plans have been thwarted by the
threat of harsher legal procedures or other legal changes. "[E]ach
new attack tends to raise a presumption of ineffectiveness in relation
to existing and earlier measures of legal control (how else to explain
its occurrence?)."'5 2 As at least one scholar has noted, "the whole
subject is beset by an obscure and uncertain state of knowledge and
147. See VERCHER, supra note 7, at 32.
148. Id. at 46.
149. See supra Part I.D.
150. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
72 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696); Al Odah v. United States, 321
F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607-
08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3488 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1027;
Edward Alden, Guantanamo Bay Detainees Seek Ruling, FIN. TIMES, September 4,
2003. But see Philip Shenon, Government Lawyers Fear 9/11 Ruling Threatens Qaeda
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at All (federal judge bars evidence that suspected
terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui was involved in 9/11 attacks).
151. Christopher Harding, 2002 Special Feature: Terrorism, Security, and Rights
International Terrorism: The British Response, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 16.
152. Id.
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understanding." '153 Another scholar notes that some questions of
effectiveness are "untestable."' 54 What follows is an attempt to make
some measurement of the effectiveness of the European responses to
terrorism in this context of uncertainty.
In Spain, strong doubts have been voiced that the system of
prolonged detention has helped authorities obtain evidence and
facilitate investigation.155 Spain completely abandoned the use of
military courts in cases of terrorism.156 Despite successive legal
attempts to thwart Basque terrorists, there have been no decreases in
deaths that can be directly ascribed to these attempts. As mentioned
above, this raises doubts that the specific legal measures have had any
effect.157 In sum, the costs in terms of civil liberties were not paid back
in terms of stopping terrorism.
There is disagreement over whether Britain's exclusion orders
were useful in fighting terrorism."8 Some believed terrorists were
"substantially impaired" because of their inability to travel between
the United Kingdom and Ireland.'59 On the other hand, critics argued
that there was no hard evidence that exclusion orders have prevented
terrorism and that, in any case, they infringed on civil rights.'60 It is
difficult to measure the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's
internment efforts.1 6' The abandonment of internment16 2 was perhaps
a sign of its ineffectiveness or its high cost in civil liberties. Likewise,
it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of Britain's arrests and
information-gathering systems in their fight against terrorism.
Nevertheless, the increased surveillance and powers of arrest at ports
has increased the governments' ability to gather information, again at
a cost of civil liberties.' The use of accomplices and informers in
Northern Ireland has been abused and the judiciary has allowed it
153. Id.
154. See VERCHER, supra note 7, at 85.
155. Id. at 256.
156. Id. at 337.
157. See Harding, supra note 153.
158. See Clive Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against
Terrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 16-18 (1997).
159. Id. at 16-17.
160. Id. at 17-18.
161. VERCHER, supra note7, at 30.
162. Id. at 22.
163. Id. at 85.
164. Id. at 84-85.
[Vol. 27:397
Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism
and disallowed it at various times."' This perhaps demonstrates that,
again, any benefits came at a high price in civil liberties. This same
trade-off applies to the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland.
In Spain and the United Kingdom, one lesson is clear. Harsher
legal procedures will not stop terrorism. The legal mechanisms
discussed above did not prevent terrorist acts altogether. On the
other hand, it is likely some of the procedures reduced some terrorist
activity or at least made it more costly to terrorist organizations.
Nevertheless, it is difficult-if not impossible-to test how many
more terrorist acts would have been undertaken but for the use of
these terrorist procedures.
It is also clear that the procedures have imposed high costs in
terms of democratic values. All of the procedures represent a shift
from standard Western judicial practice. It is argued that such
practices are necessitated by terrorism.' 66 When the benefits from
these procedures are so few, however, it is more likely that these
harsher procedures are either an emotional response or an attempt by
governments to show they are in control.67 Thus, while gauging the
success of anti-terrorism legal changes is difficult, measuring the costs
of these same changes is far easier. For example, in Spain, evidence
showed there was a connection between prolonged detention and
torture.16 In other words, we do not know if harsher legal measures
help, but we do know they impose significant constraints on civil
liberties.
In Spain and the United Kingdom, negotiation and other
political means have provided some success in stopping bouts of
terrorist violence. The granting of limited autonomy to the Basque
country after Franco's death in Spain and the Good Friday
Agreement '69 in Northern Ireland produced periods of peace. While
the peace has not been constant or complete, the effects of
negotiation have saved more lives than any procedural measures.
Likewise, the decline of Iranian terrorist attacks in France was
likely more attributable to political causes rather than legal
165. Id. at 118.
166. Id. at 156.
167. See Harding, supra note 151.
168. VERCHER, supra note 7, at 256-57.
169. See Irish Republican Army, supra note 38 (explaining that the IRA agreed to
the Good Friday agreement which recognized that the majority of the population of
Northern Ireland would determine whether the province would remain part of
Britain, but pointing out that the peace process is not complete).
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adaptations. A spurt of alleged Iranian attacks came in 1985 through
1986, when France was selling arms to Iraq.17' The Iran-Iraq war
ended in 1988. The end of the war meant French sales to Iraq were
less threatening to Iran and thus the incentive was gone for Iran to
support terrorist acts in France. Nevertheless, France has
experienced terrorist incidents since 1986 and continues to be a target
today. France's 1986 anti-terrorist act did not solve France's terrorist
problem altogether.
In sum, these three European countries gained no dramatic
advantages from their harsh legal response to terrorism. Gains came
from political action and dialogue. Harsher legal procedures,
however, generated criticism, reduced civil liberties and undermined
the integrity of the judiciary.
VI. Prudence of the U.S. Response in Light of Europe's
History with Terrorism
The U.S. legal response to terrorism is not prudent to the extent
it is costing more in terms of civil liberties and democratic prestige
than it is gaining in terms of stopping terrorism. Having a nation
ruled by laws generates respect from other countries. Proper
procedure makes the outcomes of trials relatively trustworthy and
respectable, even if they are not always correct. Overall, the rule of
law has benefits, all of which cannot be discussed here.17' The
American Bar Association (ABA) has criticized the military tribunals
for placing too many restrictions on defense attorneys,"' and past
ABA President Lawrence Goldberg has referred to the proceedings
as a "sham."'" Even British parliament members have said American
military tribunals would amount to "kangaroo court[s]."'174 Great
Britain, America's biggest ally in the war on terror, has protested the
detention of two British citizens at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on the
grounds the military tribunals do not conform to international
standards for fair trials.77 The ABA and Great Britain's positions
170. See Pluchinsky, supra note 138, at 12.
171. See generally, Gross, supra note 1 (presenting some benefits).
172. Jonathan D. Glater, ABA Urges Fairness in Tribunal Cases, CHI. TRIB.,
August 13, 2003, at C20.
173. Id.
174. See Doug Cassel, A Chilling Double Standard Turns U.S. into Its Own
Enemy, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2003, at C1.
175. See Rosemary Bennett & Roland Watson, Pentagon Lawyer to Negotiate in
London over Guantanamo Trials, TIMES (London), Aug. 7, 2003, at 6.
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demonstrate the lack of legitimacy that stems from overly-harsh
procedures. By cutting off due process, the United States is losing
clout and undermining the rule of law.
The U.S. legal response is prudent to the extent the small gains in
intelligence and prevention of future terrorist acts are worth the
sacrifices in terms of human rights and national prestige. As we saw
above, the United States has sustained more terrorist casualties than
Europe has in a short amount of time. There is good reason to
believe the desire of terrorists to cause massive damage is greater
with respect to the United States than it has ever been with respect to
Europe. As a result, it could be argued that draconian legal changes
are a necessity in the United States. When faced with the possibility
of chemical, biological or nuclear attacks,'76 some argue that the
potential benefits of such laws outweigh the costs in civil liberties.'
On the other hand, would adding more judicial process and
protection for defendants undermine the government's effort?
Probably not. Great Britain abandoned internment, for example,
without abandoning its fight against terrorism.
Congress and the administration cannot win the war on terrorism
with harsh legal changes. As we saw above, legal changes simply did
not stop terrorist attacks. Congress and the administration will
probably realize some minor gains. In Europe, increased
intergovernmental cooperation and increased surveillance capabilities
have proven at least somewhat useful. 8 The United States has made
finding information within the various U.S. agencies easier and has
also increased its ability to collect information.'79 It is likely that these
changes will generate or have generated at least some additional
intelligence in the United States as well.
The United States should also not completely defer to Europe's
legal history with terrorism. As we saw above,n there are important
176. See David Johnston et al., Qaeda's New Links Increase Threats From Far-
Flung Sites, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al (mentioning an alleged plot to explode
a "dirty bomb" in the United States).
177. We Need to Know the Wartime Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 13, 2002, at 41
(arguing that "we have to be prepared in times of national emergency to bend the
rules in the interest of defending ourselves").
178. See Major al-Qaeda Attack Foiled, BBC, Jan. 24, 2003, at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/ europe/2690629.stm> (mentioning a plot foiled
due to European cooperation).
179. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part 11.
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differences between terrorism in the United States and Europe.
Terrorism in Europe has tended to be domestic and international
terrorism there has been less deadly than in the United States. Given
these differences, harsh legal reforms in the United States could yield
a different experience, despite the lack of success with Europe's own
harsh legal reforms. For example, exclusion may be of limited use in
Spain and the United Kingdom, because terrorists there are home-
grown. On the other hand, terrorists targeting the United States
appear to be primarily from the Islamic world. Since it is easier to
exclude those who are already outside a country, U.S. attempts at
exclusion could theoretically be more effective than the European
attempts. Of course, the United States would still suffer costs in
terms of civil liberties.18'
There is no certain response to the question set out in this note,
especially since it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of legal
adaptations to terrorism." There are some benefits to harsher legal
procedures. Likewise, there are significant costs that go with them. If
the United States is being prudent or imprudent, it is by a margin.
On balance however, the U.S. response is an overreaction in light
of European history. Bush's military tribunals are reminiscent of
authoritarian regimes, such as Franco's military tribunals in Spain.'
83
When Spain transitioned to a democracy, it abandoned these vestiges
of dictatorship. Great Britain, whose democratic traditions are
closely related to U.S. democratic traditions, abandoned its use of
internment and has not created any courts void of judicial review like
the military tribunals in Cuba. While the September 11 attacks on the
United States were unprecedented in magnitude, it does not follow
that traditional legal values should be put aside. Implementing more
procedural safeguards would create a system more in line with
Western legal values that would still be capable of fighting terrorism.
If the U.S. legal reaction to terrorism is somewhat imprudent, it
should be noted that Europe itself has also failed to learn from its
past mistakes. The United States was not alone in implementing legal
reforms post-September 11. The United Kingdom, for example,
enacted the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act in December of
2001."8 The act, which provides for the detention of suspected
181. See, e.g., supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
184. Henning, supra note 116, at 1265 (citing Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
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terrorists even when contrary to international law,"' was criticizedand challenged by civil rights advocates."8
Conclusion
The United States and Europe have had problems with terrorism
that have led both continents to implement harsh legal reforms. The
United States, Spain, France and Great Britain have all used
prolonged detentions, procedurally-stripped courts and increased
investigative abilities to fight terrorism and thereby lessen civil
liberties. The U.S. response has perhaps been the harshest. While
the attacks on the United States were also the most dramatic, the
legal responses of Congress and the President are, on the whole,
imprudent in light of European history. They will definitely not stop
terrorism. Any gains will be outweighed by losses in civil liberty and
legal clout. More procedural safeguards would bring the legal
response back in line with Western legal values while still providing a
limited remedy for terrorism. As others have argued, perhaps the
best defenses against terrorism would be fundamental changes in
foreign policy and global political and economic structures.
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